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How emergency departments of different levels and
types cope with a large-scale contagious infectious disease
is unclear. We retrospectively analyzed the response of
100 emergency departments regarding use of personal
protective equipment (PPE) and implementation of infec-
tion control measures (ICMs) during the severe acute res-
piratory syndrome outbreak in Taiwan. Emergency
department workers in large hospitals were more severely
affected by the epidemic. Large hospitals or public hospi-
tals were more likely to use respirators. Small hospitals
implemented more restrictive ICMs. Most emergency
departments provided PPE (80%) and implemented ICMs
(66%) at late stages of the outbreak. Instructions to use
PPE or ICMs more frequently originated by emergency
department administrators. The difficulty of implementing
ICMs was significantly negatively correlated with their
effectiveness. Because ability to prepare for and respond to
emerging infectious diseases varies among hospitals,
grouping infectious patients in a centralized location in an
early stage of infection may reduce the extent of epidemics. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly
emerging infectious disease in humans. The initial out-
break, which occurred in November 2002 in China,
marked the beginning of a pandemic that spread rapidly
around the globe, resulting in >8,000 reported cases (1).
Taiwan was the third region to be affected by the outbreak
because of its frequent contact with China and Hong Kong.
The first case in Taiwan was reported on February 1, 2003,
and a total of 671 probable cases had been reported by
June 15 (2). The turning point of the SARS outbreak in
Taiwan occurred when a healthcare laundry worker with
atypical SARS symptoms visited the emergency depart-
ment of hospital A (located at Taipei City) 3 times (on
April 12, 14, and 15) and was admitted to an ordinary ward
without quarantine (3). The outbreak at hospital A
occurred on April 22, then spread from hospital A to other
hospitals. Before the hospital A outbreak, most hospitals
did not anticipate the extent of the SARS epidemic. 
Many healthcare workers (HCWs) were infected during
the SARS epidemic (3–8). Protecting HCWs from contam-
ination was the first priority of infection control measures
(ICMs) in hospitals. In response to the growing epidemic,
most hospitals followed the recommendations of the
Department of Health (DOH), which were similar to those
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
World Health Organization (9–11). However, in some hos-
pitals, additional measures were also taken to prevent a
hospital outbreak when hospital managers believed that
the existing recommendations were ineffective or insuffi-
cient. During the SARS outbreak, the emergency depart-
ment played a vital role in infection control because many
patients with fever sought medical attention in an emer-
gency department. Facing a new disease, emergency
department personnel were unable to make decisions
regarding timing of personal protective equipment (PPE)
usage and classification of infectious disease because the
means of transmission were unclear and early identifica-
tion was difficult (unclear clinical symptoms and lack of a
laboratory test). 
Previous studies have demonstrated that effectively
implementing ICMs can control and prevent an outbreak
(12,13). However, the problem is not just a question of
control in individual hospitals. The control measures must
be coordinated throughout the healthcare system, and these
measures must be implemented in the initial stage, not just
in the late stage. Whether emergency departments had the
ability to make adequate preparations or implement all the
necessary ICMs was unclear. Because policymakers
lacked adequate information about the capacity and ability
of hospital or emergency departments to implement such
measures, no decisions were made in the early stages of
the outbreak about whether to divert or group persons with
suspected or probable cases of SARS into a centralized
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hospital-based study was to collect data from hospitals of
various levels and analyze the ability of the hospitals’
emergency departments to cope with the SARS outbreak.
These data may be used to improve the effectiveness of
existing emergency protocols before the reemergence of
SARS, influenza, or other infectious disease. Hence, poli-
cymakers, as well as administrators of hospitals and emer-
gency departments, will be able to make more effective
decisions in the early stage of an infectious disease.
Materials and Methods
Taiwan had 468 hospitals in 2003, 393 (83.9%) private
and 75 (16.1%) public. Data were collected from emer-
gency departments in which the number of patients
exceeded 500 per month. Questionnaires were sent to
chiefs of staff at emergency departments in late June 2003.
The questionnaire was designed by emergency department
experts after panel discussions. The data collected includ-
ed the following: accreditation of the hospitals, the average
monthly volume of emergency department patients from
March to May 2003, the effects of the SARS epidemic on
emergency department workers, types of PPE supplied,
kinds of ICMs implemented, as well as timing and origin
of instruction to use PPE and ICMs during the SARS epi-
demic. 
Before data analyses, hospitals were classified into 3
levels, medical center (level A), regional hospital (level B),
or local hospital (level C). In general, the number of hos-
pital beds at these hospitals, based on reference data, was
>500 in level A, 200–500 in level B, and <200 in level C.
The average monthly volume of emergency department
patients was an average of the monthly emergency depart-
ment volumes during the 3-month period. The hospitals
were grouped first by level, and then the average was cal-
culated. The average of the averages for each hospital was
then determined. Emergency department workers were
classified as physicians, nursing staff, or paramedics. The
effects on emergency department staff were measured
according to a 4-point scale, as follows: 1) had fever and
needed to stay at home, 2) quarantined at home with fever
or no fever, 3) quarantined at hospital, and 4) probably had
SARS. 
The basic PPE recommended by the DOH included
head and shoe covers, goggles, face shield, gloves, apron,
disposable gown, surgical mask, and N95 respiratory
mask. Hand hygiene was excluded as a protection measure
because accurate assessment was difficult. The high-level
protective respirators were defined as P100/ N100/ FFP3
(approved by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health [NIOSH]) and powered air-purifying
respirators with full-body isolation suit. ICMs included the
guidelines from the DOH (defined as basic ICMs) as well
as additional measures, such as having a fever triage ward
or referral to a SARS screening team, implemented by
emergency departments during the SARS outbreak. The
timing of complete PPE implementation or having ICMs
completely in place was classified into 2 stages: 1) early
stage, from March to late April, 2) late stage, from late
April to mid-June. The order to use PPE or ICMs came
from 3 sources: 1) emergency department workers them-
selves, 2) emergency department administrators, and 3)
hospital administrators. The difficulty of implementing or
instituting ICMs was rated on a scale from 1 (mildly diffi-
cult) to 5 (very difficult). The effectiveness of implement-
ing ICMs was rated on a scale from 1 (less effective) to 5
(very effective). All ratings were based on self-assess-
ments of hospital staff.
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
test the differences in the average monthly volumes of
patients among different levels and types of emergency
departments. The associations between categorical vari-
ables were analyzed by chi-square and Fisher exact test.
The rating scale of difficulty and effectiveness of ICMs
was represented by median and interquartile range (IQR).
The correlation between difficulty and effectiveness was
analyzed by Spearman rank correlation; p values <0.05
were considered significant.
Results
A total of 213 emergency departments were initially
included in this study; 152 (71.4%) were private hospitals
and 61 (28.6%) were public hospitals. One hundred emer-
gency departments responded to the questionnaire (respon-
dent rate = 46.9%). Among these, 15 emergency
departments were medical centers (respondent rate =
65.2%, including 6 public and 9 private emergency depart-
ments), 28 emergency departments were regional hospitals
(respondent rate = 38.9%, including 10 public and 18 pri-
vate), and 57 emergency departments (respondent rate =
44.9%, including 14 public and 43 private) were local hos-
pitals. The overall response rate was 46.0% in public hos-
pitals and 49.1% in private hospitals. 
The emergency department volumes and assessment of
the effects of the SARS outbreak on emergency depart-
ment workers are shown in Table 1. From March to May
2003, the average monthly volume of emergency depart-
ment patients in level A hospitals was 6,200 (range
3,429–11,080) and 3,828 (range 1,864–5,770) in level B
hospitals, both of which were significantly larger than the
average number of patients in level C hospitals (average
2,246, range 729–3,236) (p = 0.001). No significant differ-
ences in emergency department volume were found
between public (average 2,642, range 1,364–6,258) and
private hospitals (average 3,398, range 729–11,080). The
most frequent effect of the SARS outbreak on emergency
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home.” Emergency department workers in level A and B
hospitals had a higher probability of being affected during
the SARS outbreak, regardless of job type. When the
effects of the SARS outbreak on public and private hospi-
tals were compared, significant differences were found
between the type of quarantine at hospitals. 
PPE supplied by emergency departments is shown in
Table 2. The use of basic PPE did not differ significantly
among emergency departments at different hospital levels.
However, level A emergency departments used high grade
PPE (P100/N100/FFP3 or powered air-purifying respira-
tor) more often than emergency departments at level B and
C hospitals. The implemented ICMs in different hospitals
are shown in Table 3. Most of the hospitals were able to
follow the guidelines of the DOH. However, in terms of
additional ICMs, emergency departments of level C hospi-
tals used more restrictive measures when transferring
patients in and out. The use of ICMs in public and private
hospital was significantly different in patients who were
transferred out. The timing of PPE usage or implementa-
tion of ICMs is shown in Table 4. Eighty percent (80/100)
of hospitals completely implemented use of PPE, and 66%
(66/100) of hospitals implemented their ICMs at the late
stage of the SARS outbreak. The instruction to use PPE
originated from emergency department managers in 60%
of level A, 46% of level B, and 23% of level C hospitals.
The order to implement ICMs came from hospital man-
agers in 33% of level A, 50% of level B, and 62% of level
C hospitals.
Table 5 shows the rating scales and correlations of diffi-
culty and effectiveness of ICMs in emergency departments.
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departments was thought to be the most difficult (median =
3 score). Additional ICMs were more difficult to implement
than basic ICMs. The effectiveness of additional ICMs was
also thought to be less than that of basic ICMs. Closing
emergency departments was thought to be less effective.
Overall, the effectiveness of ICMs decreased as difficulty
of implementation increased. Significant negative correla-
tions were seen between perceived difficulty and effective-
ness of implemented ICMs, except for body temperature at
admission, institution of a fever screening station, and clo-
sure of the emergency department. 
Discussion
Impact of SARS on Emergency Departments 
in Larger Hospitals
In our study, emergency department workers in larger
hospitals were more severely affected by the SARS
outbreak than staff at smaller hospitals. Several possible
reasons could explain this finding. First, as our data
showed, emergency departments at larger hospitals tend to
have more patients requiring emergency services than
those at smaller emergency departments. Thus, overcrowd-
ing and more frequent contact with patients would increase
the incidence of person-to-person transmission.
Emergency department workers may have become infect-
ed even without contact with a hospitalized SARS patient
(14). Second, most larger hospitals were located in an
urban area. Persons living in urban areas may be more
likely to travel overseas, which would increase their
chances of contracting an infectious disease. Asimilar phe-
nomenon was reported at hospitals in cities with a high
population density, such as Beijing, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Toronto (14–19). Third, fever patients
tended to visit larger hospitals in the belief that they would
be able to see a specialist who could identify the fever
source. Finally, emergency departments at larger hospitals
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fever of unknown origin may have been transferred from
lower level hospitals.
In Taiwan, emergency department volume does not
always correlate well with either hospital bed number or
with hospital location (such as urban versus. nonurban).
This lack of correlation may explain, in part, the large vari-
ation in numbers of emergency department patients in
level A hospitals. During the SARS outbreak, some
patients were transferred to larger hospitals in both urban
and semiurban areas. Therefore, preventing outbreaks at
larger hospitals during an epidemic of an emerging disease
is essential. 
Use of High-Grade PPE and Additional ICMs
In our analysis, most of the emergency departments in
Taiwan followed the guidelines for basic PPE provided by
the DOH. Some hospitals did not use these basic recom-
mended PPE because they already had other PPE that per-
formed the same function. However, some hospitals may
have had an inadequate supply of PPE. In fact, a substan-
tial problem for hospitals during the SARS epidemic was
the cost of basic PPE, such as surgical masks and N95 res-
piratory masks, which increased costs markedly during
this period. The quantity of PPE required by larger hospi-
tals was very large, which placed a financial hardship on
these hospitals, even though many of them did not
encounter any SARS cases. Some hospitals were so anx-
ious to acquire sufficient basic PPE that they even request-
ed recycled PPE if it was available. The supply of higher
grade respirators was greater at larger hospitals than at
smaller hospitals. This finding may have been because
hospital outbreaks were generally more common at larger
hospitals and more patients who needed emergency resus-
citation were transferred to larger hospitals. Transfers
inevitably increased the risk for transmission to emergency
workers (14). 
In our analysis, most hospitals implemented basic
ICMs during the SARS epidemic, but smaller emergency
departments more frequently used more restrictive ICMs.
Paradoxically, smaller hospital appeared to be more alert
to the emerging disease, although the number of emer-
gency department patients was lower than in larger emer-
gency departments. This may have been because smaller
hospitals were aware that they lacked the ability and
capacity to treat SARS patients and therefore implemented
additional ICMs to prevent an outbreak. Smaller hospitals
were more likely than larger hospitals to restrict the
patients from being transferred in than to transfer out sus-
pected case-patients during the epidemic. Placing the sus-
pected SARS patients in an isolation room was
recommended. However, most hospitals, both public and
private, found this a considerable challenge (20–22). Lack
of isolation rooms became the key reason for transferring
patients out and restricting the transfer of patients in.
Because of the difficulty of isolating all suspected patients,
implementing additional ICMs became the best strategy
for most emergency departments. This strategy may have
resulted in more patients with fever being transferred to a
large hospital, thereby exposing these hospitals to a high
risk of an outbreak. An inadequate number of isolation
rooms will still be a problem in the next large-scale epi-
demic.
Use of PPE and ICMs in Late Stage of Epidemic
Because the effects of SARS on the healthcare system
were unknown in early stages, most hospitals had no clear-
ly defined response plan and were unsure when to imple-
ment ICMs. In our analysis, use of PPE or ICMs in the
emergency department usually began at the outset of the
epidemic (outbreak at hospital A). The attitude of most
hospital administrators was to keep an eye on the situation,
especially in private hospitals. Administrators were con-
cerned that additional ICMs would decrease the volume of
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makers in the initial stage who were concerned that the
SARS epidemic would have a devastating effect on the
nation’s economy and would cause widespread panic. Few
hospitals actually prepared an infection response plan in
the early stage that included the preparation of PPE and
design of ICMs. Some hospitals did not even begin to con-
sider how to implement these measures until they were
directly facing the SARS epidemic. 
PPE and ICMs were a financial hardship for private
hospitals (>80% of hospitals in Taiwan). The reimburse-
ment for private hospitals comes from the Bureau of
National Health Insurance, depending on what services are
provided. During the SARS epidemic, the overall volume
of patients decreased, which affected the income of emer-
gency departments and hospitals (23). In a future epidem-
ic, without immediate government assistance at the crucial
early stage, the effectiveness of hospitals’response will be
reduced. 
Implementing Additional ICMs 
Implementing basic ICMs was easier and more effec-
tive than implementing additional ICMs. Most of the basic
ICMs were directly ordered by the DOH, so hospitals were
required to fully support the emergency departments. This
fact may explain why these basic ICMs were rated low in
difficulty to implement and thought to have high effective-
ness. Whether additional ICMs protected smaller hospitals
is unclear, but these measures did appear to decrease the
risk of an outbreak in lower level hospitals. However, dif-
ficulty and effectiveness of ICMs had a significant nega-
tive correlation. This finding may have been because
physicians were required to spend more time communicat-
ing with patients or with outside hospitals, which also had
the effect of causing the number of complaints and dis-
agreements between physicians and patients to rise. The
effectiveness of additional ICMs could be increased by
making their implementation less difficult. Some of these
additional ICMs will place a great strain on the healthcare
system and render it incapable of functioning normally.
Early recognition and rapid initiation of infection control
precautions are the most important strategies for control-
ling large-scale infectious disease outbreaks (24). If recog-
nizing a new or large-scale contagious infectious disease in
the early stage is not possible, implementing additional
ICMs in hospitals, especially smaller hospitals, may be
unavoidable because the first priority for hospital man-
agers is to prevent a hospital outbreak. To avoid disrupting
the healthcare system when additional ICMs are imple-
mented, the DOH should do its utmost to provide full
financial support and other assistance. If equal support
from the DOH for all hospitals is not practical, a central-
ized system for suspected patients may be considered as a
strategy to reduce the severity and extent of an epidemic.
This strategy may decrease the high incidence of person-
to-person transmission in larger hospitals and may enhance
the ability of smaller hospitals to treat patients with sus-
pected cases. Implementing a centralized system of quar-
antine is controversial, however, because ethical issues are
involved (25). 
The response rate of the present study was low, so
results may have been affected by nonresponse bias. The
nonresponding emergency departments may have had less
effective systems in place when they responded to the
SARS epidemic. Thus, the degree of variability among
emergency departments may have been underestimated. In
addition, little seasonal variation in emergency department
volume occurs in Taiwan, and any seasonal variation in the
3-month period was likely to be negligible.
The findings of this study suggest that policymakers
should understand the different abilities of hospitals to
respond to an epidemic. In addition, support and control
measures should be implemented more effectively and
made immediately available to all hospitals, whether pub-
lic or private. Understanding the ability and capacity of
different hospitals to respond to a contagious disease will
enable policymakers to design effective infection control
measures to safeguard the health of the nation.
Dr. Chen is chief of staff of the emergency department of
China Medical University Hospital, a medical center and teach-
ing hospital in central Taiwan. His primary research interests
include disaster response planning and emergency department
management.
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